Abstract. Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals. It is shown that generalized Prikry forcing to add a countable sequence to each cardinal in D is subcomplete. To do this it is shown that a simplified version of generalized Prikry forcing which adds a point below each cardinal in D, called generalized diagonal Prikry forcing, is subcomplete. Moreover, the generalized diagonal Prikry forcing associated to D is subcomplete above µ, where µ is any regular cardinal below the first limit point of D.
Introduction
Subcomplete forcing notions are a family of forcing notion that do not add reals and may be iterated using revised countable support. Examples of subcomplete forcing include all countably closed forcing, Prikry forcing, and Namba forcing (under CH), as shown by Ronald B. Jensen [Jen14, Section 3.3] . It is clear from these examples that not all subcomplete forcing notions are proper, and, conversely, nontrivial ccc forcing notions are never subcomplete [Min17] . For more on subcomplete forcing and its characteristics, refer to Jensen (primarily [Jen14] and [Jen09] ), and the author's doctoral thesis [Min17] .
Recently, Fuchs [Fuc17] has shown that Magidor forcing is also subcomplete. Here an adaptation of Jensen's proof showing that Prikry forcing is subcomplete is employed to see that many Prikry-like forcing notions, in particular those which will be referred to here as generalized diagonal Prikry forcing, following Fuchs [Fuc05] , are subcomplete.
In section 2, some preliminary topics are introduced that may be found in Jensen's lecture notes from the 2012 AII Summer School in Singapore (for the published version refer to [Jen14] , here the version posted on Jensen's website is what is referenced). The notion of the weight of a forcing and fullness of a structure are then introduced, which lead to the definition of subcompleteness given in section 2.3 and subcompleteness above µ in section 2.4. Important techniques of Barwise theory are introduced in section 2.5, and the ultrapower-like notion of a liftup, to obtain full structures, is introduced in section 2.6. In section 3 the definition of generalized diagonal Prikry foring is given, and it is shown that such forcing notions are subcomplete. Moreover, it is shown that diagonal Prikry forcing is subcomplete above µ where µ is a regular cardinal below the first limit point of the infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals used in the forcing.
2.2. Fullness. Suppose that P is a forcing notion and s is a set, with P, s ∈ H θ , where θ is sufficiently large. Instead of just working with H θ and its well order (as is done for the definition of proper forcing), the models used for defining subcompleteness will have the form L τ [A] ⊇ H θ where L τ [A] |= ZFC − such that τ > θ is a (possibly singular) cardinal, and A ⊆ τ . Typically, the convention is to set N = L τ [A] for brevity. Rather than spell this out every time, write N is a suitable model for P, s above θ. Such H θ will need to be large enough so that N has the correct ω 1 and H ω1 . One reason for working with these models is that such N will naturally contain a well order of H θ , along with its Skolem functions. Additionally a benefit of working with such models is that L τ [A] is easily definable in L τ [A] [G], if G is generic, using A. In the standard fashion, if X N is a countable elementary substructure, we can take its transitive collapse and write N ∼ = X. This gives rise to an elementary embedding σ : N ∼ = X N. Often we suppress the mention of the range of σ in the above and just write σ : N ≺ N . In fact, it will not be quite enough for such an N to be transitive. We will want to be in a situation where there is more than one elementary embedding of N into N . This will be end up being possible if we require that the model N is full.
Note that, given σ : N ≺ N where N is countable and transitive, the critical point cp(σ) is exactly ω , for some cardinal τ and set A, let X be a set, and let δ be a cardinal. Our notation for the Skolem hull of δ ∪ X in N is Hull N (δ ∪ X). It is defined to be the smallest Y N satisfying X ∪ δ ⊆ Y . Toward defining fullness, the notion of regularity of transitive models needs to be defined. Definition 2.3. We say that N is regular in M so long as N ⊆ M and for all functions f : x −→ N , where x is an element of N and f ∈ M , we have that f "x ∈ N .
The following lemma is meant to elucidate the significance of regularity as a kind of second-order replacement scheme. Proof. For the backward direction, suppose that N = H M γ where γ = height(N ) is a regular cardinal in M . Then for all f : x −→ N , with x ∈ N and f ∈ M , certainly f "x ∈ N as well.
For the forward direction, indeed γ has to be regular in M since otherwise M would contain a cofinal function f : α −→ γ where α < γ. By the transitivity of N , this implies that α ∈ N . Thus ∪f "α is in N |= ZFC − by regularity, so γ ∈ N , a contradiction. We have that N ⊆ H M γ since N is a transitive ZFC − model, so the transitive closure of elements of N may be computed in N and thus have size less than γ, so they are in
We assume by ∈-induction that x ⊆ N . Then there is a surjection f : α ։ x where α < γ, in M . Hence by regularity, x = f "α ∈ N as desired.
Definition 2.5. We say that M is full so long as ω ∈ M , and there is a γ such that M is regular in
Perhaps the property of fullness seems rather mysterious at first, but for the context of subcompleteness, it will be important to have; indeed, the fullness of a countable substructure N of N guarantees that N not pointwise definable, a necessary condition for the potential existence of more than one embedding from N to N . Lemma 2.6. If M is countable and full, then M is not pointwise definable in the language of set theory.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that M is countable, full, and pointwise definable. By fullness there is some L γ (M ) |= ZFC − such that M is regular in L γ (M ). By pointwise definability, for each element m ∈ M , we have attached to it some formula ϕ(x) such that M |= ϕ(m) uniquely, meaning that ϕ(y) fails for every other element y ∈ M . Thus in L γ (M ) we may define a function f : ω ∼ = M , that takes the nth formula in the language of set theory to its unique witness in M . In particular we have that L γ (M ) witnesses that M is countable. However, this would allow M to witness its own countability, since M must contain f as well by regularity. Definition 2.7. A forcing notion P is complete so long as for any set s and sufficiently large θ we have that once we are in the following situation:
• N is a suitable model for P, s above θ;
• σ : N ∼ = X N where X is countable and N is transitive;
• σ(θ, P, s) = θ, P, s.
and G is P-generic over N then there is a completeness condition p ∈ P forcing that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, σ" G ⊆ G.
In particular, below the condition p we have that σ lifts to an embedding σ * :
. We say that a θ as above verifies the completeness of P.
The adjustment made to get subcomplete forcings is to not insist the the original embedding lifts in the forcing extension. Instead subcompleteness asks for an embedding, sufficiently similar to the original one, which lifts to the extension, but may itself only exist in the extension. As discussed in Section 2.2, the domain of the embedding should be full so as to not consistently rule out the possibility of the existence of multiple embeddings like this. Definition 2.8. A forcing notion P is subcomplete so long as, for any set s and for sufficiently large θ we have that whenever we are in the standard setup i.e.:
• σ : N ∼ = X N where X is countable and N is full;
• σ(θ, P, s) = θ, P, s; then we have that if G is P-generic over N then there is a subcompleteness condition p ∈ P such that whenever G ∋ p is P-generic, there is σ ′ ∈ V [G] satisfying:
In other words and in particular, the subcompleteness condition p forces that there is an embedding σ ′ in the extension V [G] which lifts, by (4), to an embedding
We say that such a θ as above verifies the subcompleteness of P.
Often we write δ instead of δ(P) for the weight of P when there should be no confusion as to which poset P we are working with.
1
Remark 2.9. Let P be subcomplete as verified by θ and let θ ′ > θ. Then if N is a suitable model for P above θ ′ , it is not hard to see that the very same N is a suitable model for P above θ as well. Thus P is subcomplete as verified by every θ ′ > θ. This tells us that P is subcomplete as long as it is verified by some θ. So "sufficiently large θ" may be replaced with "some θ" in the definition of subcompleteness. Definition 2.10. Let µ be a cardinal. We say that a forcing notion P is subcomplete above µ so long as for every set s and sufficiently large θ > µ, whenever we are in the standard setup (as in the definition of subcomplete forcing) in which
• σ(θ, µ, P, s) = θ, µ, P, s; then, for any G ⊆ P, there is a subcompleteness condition p ∈ P such that whenever
As usual, this means that in particular below the condition p there is an embedding σ ′ that lifts by (4) to an embedding σ ′ * :
. We say that a θ as above verifies the subcompleteness above µ of P, and we may say that P is subcomplete above µ if there is a θ that verifies its subcompleteness above µ.
Remark 2.11. If P is subcomplete then P is subcomplete above ω 1 .
Proof. By Fact 2.2, we have that for any elementary embedding such as σ or σ
The following is a key property of posets that are subcomplete above µ.
Theorem 2.12. If P is subcomplete above µ then P does not add new countable subsets of µ.
Proof. Suppose not. Let P be subcomplete above µ. Fix a condition p ∈ P and leṫ f be a name such that p ḟ :ω →μ . Take θ > µ large enough to verify the subcompleteness of P, and let N be a suitable model for P,ḟ above θ. Moreover assume we are in the standard setup.
• σ : N ∼ = X N where N is countable and full • σ(θ, µ, P, p,ḟ ) = θ, µ, P, p,ḟ . Let G be P-generic over N with p ∈ G. By the subcompleteness of P above µ there is q ∈ P such that whenever q ∈ G where G is P-generic, there is σ
Let f =ḟ G and f =ḟ G . By (4) and (5), for each n,
Thus if P is subcomplete above µ, then µ's cardinality, and even its cofinality, cannot be altered to be ω via P.
It follows from Remark 2.11 and Theorem 2.12 that subcomplete forcing does not add new reals. Jensen also makes use of models of ZF − that are not necessarily well-founded.
Definition 2.14. Let A = A, ∈ A , B 1 , B 2 , . . . be a (possibly ill-founded) model of ZF − , where A is allowed to have predicates other than ∈. The well-founded core of A, denoted wfc(A), is the restriction of A to the set of all x ∈ A such that
2 is well founded, where C(x) is the closure of {x} under ∈ A . A model A of ZF − is solid so long as wfc(A) is transitive and ∈ wfc(A) =∈ ∩ wfc(A) 2 .
Jensen [Jen14, Section 1.2] notes that every consistent set of sentences in ZF − has a solid model, and if A is solid, then ω ⊆ wfc(A). In addition,
Barwise creates an M-finite predicate logic, a first order theory in which arbitrary, but M-finite, disjunctions and conjunctions are allowed.
Definition 2.16. Let M be a transitive structure with potentially infinitely many predicates. A theory defined over M is M-finite so long as it is in M. A theory is Σ 1 (M), also known as M-recursively enumerable or M-re, if the theory is Σ 1 -definable, with parameters from M.
Of course this may be generalized to the entire usual Levy hierarchy of formulae, but only Σ 1 (M) is needed in this paper. If L is a Σ 1 (M)-definable language or theory, the rough idea is that to check whether a sentence is in L, one should imagine enumerating the formulae of L to find a sentence and a witness to it in the structure M.
, with a fixed predicate∈ and special constants denoted x for elements x ∈ M, is called an ∈-theory over M. The underlying axioms for these ∈-theories will always involve ZFC − and some basic axioms ensuring that∈ behaves nicely; the Basic Axioms are:
• Extensionality • A statement positing the extensionality of∈, which is a scheme of formulae defined for each member of M . For each x ∈ M , ∀v v∈ x ⇐⇒ z∈x v = z . Here denotes an infinite disjunction in the language.
In the above definition, it should be clarified that it is possible to consider the same ∈-theory defined over different admissible structures; if M, M ′ are both admissible, then we can consider both L(M) and L(M ′ ). The distinction is only as to where the special constants come from.
An important fact ensured by our Basic Axioms is that the interpretations of these special constants in any solid model of the theory are the same as in M:
Jensen uses the techniques of Barwise to come up with a proof system in this context, in which consistency of ∈-theories can be discussed. In particular, the semantics is sound for this syntax: if there is a model of an ∈-theory, then the theory is consistent.
Furthermore, the proof system is absolute enough that consistency statements are downward absolute. In particular, it will be useful to know that if a theory is consistent in a forcing extension, then it is consistent in the ground model. Compactness and completeness are also shown, relativized to the M-finite predicate logics that are used here; solid models of consistent Σ 1 (M) ∈-theories are produced for countable admissible structures M.
The following definition generalizes the concept of fullness.
Definition 2.21. We say that M is almost full so long as ω ∈ M and there is a solid A |= ZFC − with M ∈ wfc(A) and M is regular in A.
Clearly if M is full, then M is almost full. A useful technique when showing a particular forcing is subcomplete is to be able to transfer the consistency of ∈-theories over one admissible structure to another.
First we define what it means for an embedding to be cofinal.
Definition 2.23. We say that an elementary embedding σ : M ≺ N is cofinal so long as for each x ∈ N there is some u ∈ M such that x ∈ σ(u). Let δ ∈ M be a cardinal. We say that σ is δ-cofinal so long as every such u has size less than δ as computed in M .
The following is a fairly straightforward exercise that sheds light on some of the advantages of α-cofinal embeddings.
The Transfer Lemma is an upward absoluteness statement, transferring the consistency of a Σ 1 ∈-theory over an almost full model upward, via cofinal elementary embeddings. ( N 1 ; p 1 
2.6. Liftups. The following definitions are meant to describe a method used to obtain useful embeddings, outlining a technique that is ostensibly the ultrapower construction. The way that these embeddings are constructed facilitate the use of Barwise theory to obtain the consistency of the existence of the kind of embedding required in the definition of subcompleteness. Refer to [Jen14, Ch. 3 ] for all of the general definitions and theorems, the specific relevant necessary pieces are given here.
Definition 2.26. Let α > ω be a regular cardinal in N . Let σ : H N α ≺ H cofinally, where H is transitive. By a transitive liftup of N , σ we mean a pair N * , σ * such that Proof. We show each direction of the equivalence separately.
For the forward direction, let x ∈ N , and take u ∈ N with x ∈ σ(u) such that |u| < α in N . Let |u| = γ, and take f : γ → u a bijection in N . Then σ(f ) : σ(γ) → σ(u) is also a bijection in N by elementarity. Since x ∈ σ(u) we also have that x has a preimage under σ(f ), say β. So σ(f )(β) = x as desired.
For the backward direction, let x = σ(f )(β) be an element of N , for f : γ → N where γ < α in N and β < σ(γ). Define u = f "γ. Then in N we have that |u| < α. In addition we have that x ∈ σ(u), since σ(u) is in the range of σ(f ), where x lies.
Furthermore, Jensen shows that transitive liftups exist, provided that some extension of the original embedding exists, and have a nice factorization property. 
For the next useful lemma, a more general notion of liftups needs to be defined -where the model produced is not necessarily transitive.
Definition 2.29. Let A be a solid model of ZFC − and let τ ∈ wfc(A) be an uncountable cardinal in A. Let σ : H A τ ≺ H cofinally, where H is transitive. Then by a liftup of A, σ , we mean a pair A * , σ * such that We have that N * ⊆ wfc(A * ) and η * = σ * * (η) = height(N * ) is regular since η is. Furthermore, we will show that N * = H A * η * , completing the proof: Certainly it is the case that N * ⊆ H A * η * . But if x ∈ H η * in A * , then by regularity we have that x ∈ σ * * (u) in A * , where u ∈ A, and |u| < η in A.
Generalized Diagonal Prikry Forcing
Generalized diagonal Prikry forcing is designed to add a point below every measurable cardinal in an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals. In this section it is shown that such forcing notions are subcomplete.
Definition 3.1. Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals, meaning a set of measurable cardinals that does not contain any of its limit points. For κ ∈ D let U (κ) be a normal measure on κ, and let U denote the sequence of the U (κ)'s.
Define D = D(U), generalized diagonal Prikry forcing from the list of measures U, by taking conditions of the form (s, A) satisfying the following:
• The stem of the condition, s, is a function with domain in [D] <ω taking each measurable cardinal κ ∈ dom(s) to some ordinal s(κ) < κ.
• The upper part of the condition, A, is a function with domain D \ dom(s) taking each measurable cardinal κ ∈ dom(A) to some measure-one set A(κ) ∈ U (κ). We say that (s, A) ≤ (t, B) so long as • s ⊒ t, i.e., s is an end extension of t;
• the points in s not in t come from B, i.e., for all κ ∈ dom(s) \ dom(t),
If G is a generic filter for D, then its associated D-generic sequence is
Here the definition of D(U) differs from that of generalized Prikry foricing as given by Fuchs [Fuc05] . The main difference is that here only one point is added below each measurable cardinal κ ∈ D, which is done for simplicity's sake. It is not hard to see that the following theorem also shows that the forcing adding countably many points below each measurable cardinal in D is subcomplete. Adding countably many points below each measurable cardinal in D would collapse the cofinality of each κ ∈ D to be ω, as one expects of a Prikry-like forcing.
Also in the above definition it hasn't been enforced that the stem a condition consists only of ordinals that are wedged between successive measurables in D; ie. for κ ∈ D, it is not explicitly insisted that s(κ) ∈ [sup(D ∩ κ), κ). However, it is dense on a tail of the generic filter of D(U) for the conditions to be that way, since conditions may be strengthened by restricting their upper parts to a tail. Thus such a restriction may be freely added to the following genericity condition on D(U). 
The above genericity criterion on generalized diagonal Prikry forcing is similar to the Mathias genericity criterion for Prikry forcing.
Theorem 3.3. Let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals and let U = U (κ) | κ ∈ D be a list of normal measures associated to the measurable cardinals in D. The generalized diagonal Prikry forcing D = D(U) is subcomplete.
Proof. Let θ > δ(D) = δ be large enough, so that [δ] <ω1 ∈ H θ . First of all, it must be the case that δ, the weight of D, must be larger than all of the measurable cardinals in D.
Pf. Suppose instead that there is a dense set E ⊆ D such that sup D ≥ κ * > |E| for some κ * ∈ D. Then for each condition (s, A) ∈ E either κ * ∈ dom s or κ * ∈ dom A. So taking E * = {(s, A) ∈ E | κ ∈ dom s} ⊆ E, since |E * | < κ * as well, there is an α < κ * such that sup (s,A)∈E * s(κ * ) = α. Let p = (t, B) ∈ D be defined so that t(κ * ) = α and B(κ) = κ for all κ ∈ D \ {κ * }. Then p cannot be strengthened by any condition in E since κ * is not in any of the stems of conditions in E. So dense subsets of D must have size at least sup D.
Let ν = δ + . Let κ(0) be the first measurable cardinal in D. In order to show that D is subcomplete, let c be a set and suppose we are in the standard setup:
• N is a suitable model for D, c above θ;
• σ(θ, D, U, c) = θ, D, U, c. By our requirement on θ being large enough, we've ensured that N is closed under countable sequences of ordinals less than δ.
In what follows, we will be taking a few different transitive liftups of restrictions of σ, and it will useful to keep track of embeddings between N and N pictorially. Figure 1 shows the situation we are currently in.
Here we place bars on everything that is relevant on the N side of the embedding.
In particular, σ(δ) = δ, ν = δ + N , D is the discrete set of measurables in N that each measure in U comes from, and κ(0) is the first measurable in D, in the sense of N .
Toward showing that D is subcomplete, we are additionally given some G ⊆ D that is generic over N . Rather than working with G, we will work with S = S(κ) | κ ∈ D , its associated D-generic sequence.
Letting C = Hull N (δ ∪ X), in order to show that D is subcomplete, we will be done if we can show the following Main Claim is satisfied.
Main Claim.
There is a D-generic sequence S and a map σ ′ ∈ V [S] such that:
Pf. Ultimately this proof amounts to showing that a certain ∈-theory, L ′ , which posits the existence of such a σ ′ , is consistent. Such an embedding σ ′ cannot exist in V (otherwise the forcing D would be countably closed, which we know is not the case), but it will exist in an extension of the form V [S], where S is D-generic sequence that we will find later. Once we have such a suitable V [S], we will find an appropriate admissible structure in V [S] for which the ∈-theory L ′ , defined below, has a model.
Definition 3.4 (L ′
. Let S be a D-generic sequence. For an admissible structure M with S, S, σ, N , N, θ, D, U, c ∈ M we define the ∈-theory L ′ (M) as follows. predicate: ∈. constants:σ, x for x ∈ M. axioms:
• ZFC − and Basic Axioms;
The ∈-theory L ′ is Σ 1 (M), since all of the axioms are M-finite except for the Basic Axioms, which altogether are M-re. Recall that by Fact 2.30, the basic axioms make sure that any model A of L ′ (M) will have the property that for any x ∈ M, x A = x. In this and other ∈-theories to come, we will make explicit what our extra constants are (with L ′ we just have one extra constant, which we denoteσ). We need to find an appropriate D-generic sequence S and a suitable admissible structure M containing S so that L ′ (M) is consistent. To do this we use transitive liftups and Barwise theory. Transitive liftups will provide approximations to the embedding we are looking for, and we will rely on Barwise Completeness (Fact 2.20) to obtain the existence of a model with our desired properties.
Toward this end, let's take what will turn out to be our first transitive liftup, which is in some sense ensuring (3) of our main claim.
Let k 0 : N 0 ∼ = C where N 0 is transitive, and set σ 0 = k
Indeed N 0 is actually a transitive liftup. Pf. Recall that ν = δ + , and ν = δ + N . It must be shown that the embedding
is uniquely N -definable from some ξ < δ and σ(z) where z ∈ N . In other words, we may say that k 0 (x) is exactly that y satisfying the property that N |= ϕ(y, ξ, σ(z)) for some ϕ. Let u ∈ N be defined as u = w ∈ N | w is unique satisfying N |= ϕ(w, ζ, z) for some ζ < δ .
Certainly u is non-empty by elementarity, as we know σ(u) is nonempty, for example k 0 (x) ∈ σ(u). Furthermore, |u| ≤ δ < ν since every w ∈ u comes with a (unique) corresponding ζ < δ. Thus x ∈ k −1 0 (σ(u)) = σ 0 (u) with |u| < ν in N . So σ 0 is ν-cofinal as desired.
For the second part of the claim, recall that X = σ"N is the range of σ, and make the simple observation that σ"H
Since ν is regular in N , so is ν 0 = σ 0 (ν) = sup σ 0 "ν in N 0 , where the last equality follows since σ 0 is ν-cofinal (see Observation 2.24). By Interpolation (Fact 2.28), we may say that the transitive collapse embedding k 0 may be defined by k 0 : N 0 ≺ N where k 0 • σ 0 = σ and k 0 ↾ ν 0 = id. In particular, ν 0 is the critical point of the embedding k 0 . We illustrate the situation up to this point with Figure  2 .
The embedding σ 0 has a nice property:
This is reminiscent of (3) in the Main Claim. Importantly, we still need to find a way to extend the generic sequence S to a D-generic sequence over N .
We will now define another ∈-theory, which we will call L * . This will assist us in obtaining the diagonal Prikry extension V [S] we need to satisfy our main claim. In order to do this, we will take another transitive liftup and apply the Transfer Lemma (Fact 2.25), in order to see that this new ∈-theory is consistent over an admissible structure on N 0 .
We give a general definition of the ∈-theory we will work with. Since we will be referring to basically the same ∈-theory over two different transitive liftups, the reader should think of " * " in the subscript as a kind of placeholder for some transitive liftup. Define the infinitary ∈-theory L(L δN * (N * )) = L * as follows.
predicate: ∈. constants:σ,S, x for x ∈ L δN * (N * ).
axioms:
•S is a D * -generic sequence over N * ;
•σ"S ⊆S.
As defined, we have that L * is a Σ 1 (L δN * (N * ))-theory, since altogether the Basic Axioms are Σ 1 (L δN * (N * )).
Pf. Of course, it is not the case that σ 0 is κ(0)-cofinal -all we know is that it is ν-cofinal. However, we know how to find an elementary embedding that is κ(0) cofinal: by taking a suitable transitive liftup. Let σ 1 (θ, D, U, c) = θ 1 , D 1 , U 1 , c 1 
Figure 3 is a picture of all of the relevant transitive liftups. We first show that L 1 = L(L δN 1 (N 1 )) is consistent, by seeing that it has a model. To do this, we will find a sequence extending σ 1 "S that is D 1 -generic over N 1 . Then we will use the Transfer Lemma to see that this transfers to the consistency of L 0 .
First, force over V with D 1 = D 1 (U 1 ), which is a generalized diagonal Prikry forcing over U 1 , to obtain a diagonal Prikry sequence S 
Claim 4. The sequence S 1 is a D 1 -generic sequence over N 1 .
Pf. We will show that S 1 satisfies the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion (Fact 3.2) over N 1 . To do this, let X = X κ ∈ U 1 (κ) | κ ∈ D 1 ∈ N 1 , be a sequence of measure-one sets in the sequence of measures U 1 .
Note first that as S ′ 1 is a generic sequence, it already satisfies the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion, namely:
is finite as well, completing the proof as desired. By the κ(0)-cofinality of σ 1 , there is some w ∈ N such that X ∈ σ 1 (w), where |w| < κ(0) in N . Thus in N 1 , we have that |σ 1 (w)| < κ 1 (0). We may assume that w consists of functions f ∈ κ∈D U (κ). So for each κ ∈ σ 1 "D, we have that X κ ∈ σ 1 (w) κ = σ 1 (f )(κ) | f ∈ i∈D U (i) ∧ f ∈ w and also |σ 1 (w) κ | < κ 1 (0). So all κ ∈ σ 1 "D of course satisfy κ ≥ κ 1 (0) and thus by the κ-completeness of U 1 (κ), we have that W κ := σ 1 (w) κ ∈ U 1 (κ). So we have established that W, the sequence of W κ for κ ≥ κ 1 (0), is also a sequence of measure-one sets in N 1 . Note in addition that for κ ∈ σ 1 "D, we have that W κ ⊆ X κ .
For each κ ∈ D, we have that
w is a measure-one set in U (κ) and we also have that σ 1 (W κ ) = W σ1(κ) , all by elementarity. Moreover, κ ∈ D | S(κ) / ∈ W κ is finite by the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion applied to S. Thus by elementarity,
as is desired, completing the proof of Claim 4.
We have shown that L 1 is consistent, by Barwise Correctness (Fact 2.19), since we have just shown that H δ ; σ 1 , S 1 is a model of L 1 .
Let's check that we may now apply the Transfer Lemma (Fact 2.25) to the embedding k 1 : N 1 ≺ N 0 . By Lemma 2.31 we have that N 1 is almost full. We also have that ( N 0 ; k 1 (θ, D, U , c, θ 1 , D 1 , U 1 , c 1 ) ). Furthermore k 1 is cofinal, since for each element x ∈ N 0 , as σ 0 is cofinal, there is u ∈ N such that x ∈ σ 0 (u). Thus σ 1 (u) ∈ N 1 , and moreover x ∈ k 1 (σ 1 (u)) = σ 0 (u).
Therefore, we have that L 0 is consistent, since L 1 is consistent. This completes the proof of Claim 3.
From the consistency of L 0 (recall that L 0 is defined in Definition 3.5), we would now like to use Barwise Completeness (Fact 2.20) to obtain a model of L 0 . To do this, we need the admissible structure the theory is defined over to be countable. Pf. We will again use the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion, so let X = X κ ∈ U 1 (κ) | κ ∈ D be a sequence of measure-one sets in the sequence of measures U. Fix a dense set E ⊆ D of size δ with E ∈ C. Since δ ⊆ C, we have that E ⊆ C as well. Find a condition (s, A) ∈ E that strengthens (∅, X ). Thus for κ ∈ dom A, we have that A(κ) ⊆ X κ . Define a sequence of measure-one sets B in C so that
So we have that B is a sequence of measure-one sets in C. So {κ ∈ D | S(κ) / ∈ B(κ)} is finite. Thus {κ ∈ D | S(κ) / ∈ X κ } is finite. So S is D-generic over V , completing the proof of Claim 5.
This will be the D-generic sequence we need to satisfy the Main Claim. We will see in the following Claim 6 that * σ has all of the desired properties, but it fails to be in V [S]. However, * σ will at least enable us to see that our ∈-theory L ′ from Definition 3.4, defined to assist us in proving the Main Claim, is consistent over a suitable admissible structure.
Claim 6. The map * σ satisfies:
Pf. For (1), we have already seen above thatσ 
To see (4), note that * Letting σ ′ =σ A and σ ′ = π • σ ′ , the Main Claim is now satisfied with σ ′ and our D-generic sequence S.
Indeed let us verify each of the properties of σ ′ required by the Main Claim. The verification of these properties shall use the agreement between A and M on the special constants of M and on the ordinals. The fact that π fixes N will be greatly taken advantage of.
First we show (1) of the Main Claim. Let's say that ϕ[σ To see (2), we have σ
, and π( σ) = σ. Because of the way the ∈-theory L ′ was defined, we already have:
To see the inclusion from left to right, note that by (⋆) range We have satisfied the Main Claim, which finishes the proof that D is subcomplete.
We now describe some minor modifications of the proof that give further results. The first point is that the above proof also shows that generalized Prikry forcing that adds a countable sequence to each measurable cardinal is subcomplete. Before stating the corollary let's define the forcing. Again let D be an infinite discrete set of measurable cardinals. Let U = U (κ) | κ ∈ D be a list of measures associated to D. Let D * (U) = D * be defined in the same way as D(U) except the stem of a condition, s, in D * (U) is a function with domain in [D] <ω taking each measurable cardinal κ ∈ dom(s) to a finite set of ordinals s(κ) ⊆ κ. The upper parts are defined for each κ ∈ D, and the extension relation is defined in the same way, now a condition is strengthened by end-extending the stems on each coordinate, as well as the whole sequence of stems, and shrinking the upper parts.
We may again form a D * -generic sequence S = S G for a generic G ⊆ D * , and we may write S = S(κ) | κ ∈ D where S(κ) is a countable sequence of ordinals less than κ. The genericity criterion for generic diagonal Prikry sequences is as that for D, stated in Proof Sketch. The modifications are mostly notational, and the main one that needs to be made is to adjust the proof of Claim 4. Here we have D * 1 , the generalized diagonal Prikry forcing as computed in N 1 , as well as D * of N , and S 1 , which we would like to show is a D * 1 -generic sequence over N 1 in this case. S 1 is defined as σ 1 "S, using a diagonal Prikry sequence S ′ 1 to fill in the missing coordinates, where S ′ 1 is obtained by forcing with D 1 over V . We will show that S 1 satisfies the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion over N 1 and follow the proof of Theorem 3.3. To do this, let X = X κ ∈ U 1 (κ) | κ ∈ D 1 , with X ∈ N 1 , be a sequence of measure-one sets in the sequence of measures U 1 .
Note first that S ′ 1 is a generic sequence, so it already satisfies the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion, namely:
By the κ(0)-cofinality of σ 1 , there is some w ∈ N such that X ∈ σ 1 (w), where |w| < κ(0) in N . Thus in N 1 , |σ 1 (w)| < κ 1 (0). For each κ ∈ σ 1 "D, we have that X κ ∈ σ 1 (w) κ = σ 1 (f )(κ) | f ∈ i∈D U (i) ∧ f ∈ w and also |σ 1 (w) κ | < κ 1 (0). All κ ∈ σ 1 "D of course satisfy κ ≥ κ 1 (0) so by the κ-completeness of U 1 (κ), we have that W κ := σ 1 (w) κ ∈ U 1 (κ) since X κ ∈ σ 1 (w) κ . So we have established that W, the sequence of W κ for κ ≥ κ 1 (0), is also a sequence of measure-one sets in N 1 . Note in addition that for κ ∈ σ 1 "D, we have that W κ ⊆ X κ .
For each κ ∈ D, we have that W κ = f (κ) | f ∈ i∈D U (i) ∧ f ∈ w is a measure-one set in U (κ) and also that σ 1 (W κ ) = W σ1(κ) , all by elementarity. Moreover, α | ∃κ ∈ D α ∈ S(κ) \ W κ is finite by the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion for D, which is satisfied by S. Thus by elementarity, α | ∃κ ∈ D σ 1 (S(κ)) \ W σ1(κ) ⊇ α | ∃κ ∈ D σ 1 (S(κ)) \ X σ1(κ) is finite, as is desired, completing the proof of our modification of Claim 4.
One might consider a mixed version of D and D * , a poset that adds a single point below some measurable cardinals, and a cofinal ω-sequence below others. This forcing is clearly subcomplete as well.
Finally we show that generalized diagonal Prikry forcing is subcomplete above µ where µ is a regular cardinal less than the first limit point of the forcing's associated sequence of measurables. Furthermore, let µ < λ be a regular cardinal, where λ = sup n<ω κ n , the first limit point of D. Then D = D(U) is subcomplete above µ.
Proof Sketch. The idea is to follow the same exact proof as in Theorem 3.3, except we achieve Figure 4 .
Here we replace κ(0) with some κ ′ ∈ D such that µ < κ ′ , where there are finitely many measurables of D below κ ′ . So in particular, we let N 1 , σ 1 be the liftup of N , σ ↾ H N κ ′ in Claim 2. In order to show the that we have a generic sequence over D 1 as in Claim 4, we follow the same argument as follows: Let X = X κ ∈ U 1 (κ) | κ ∈ σ 1 "D , with X ∈ N 1 , be a sequence of measure one sets in the sequence of measures U 1 with only coordinates coming from σ 1 "D. We need to see that κ ∈ D | σ 1 (S(κ)) / ∈ X σ1(κ) is finite. By the κ ′ -cofinality of σ 1 , there is some w ∈ N such that X ∈ σ 1 (w), where |w| < κ ′ in N . Thus in N 1 , |σ 1 (w)| < κ ′ 1 . For each κ ∈ σ 1 "D, we have X κ ∈ σ 1 (w) κ = σ 1 (f )(κ) | f ∈ i∈D U (i) ∧ f ∈ w and also |σ 1 (w)| < κ ′ 1 . So for all but finitely many κ ∈ σ 1 "D, namely for κ ≥ κ ′ 1 , by the κ-completeness of U 1 (κ), we have that σ 1 (w) = W κ ∈ U 1 (κ).
So we have established that W, the sequence of W κ for κ > κ ′ 1 , is also a sequence of measure-one sets in N 1 . Note in addition that for κ ∈ σ 1 "D, κ > κ ′ 1 , we have that W κ ⊆ X κ .
By elementarity, for each κ ∈ D with κ > κ ′ ,
is a measure-one set in U (κ) and we also have that σ 1 (W κ ) = W σ1(κ) . Moreover, κ ∈ D | S(κ) / ∈ W κ is finite by the generalized diagonal Prikry genericity criterion for D, which must be satisfied by S, and since there are only finitely many measurables in D less than κ ′ in N . Thus by elementarity, κ ∈ D | σ 1 (S(κ)) / ∈ W σ1(κ) ⊇ κ ∈ D | σ 1 (S(κ) / ∈ X σ1(κ) is finite.
Additionally the ∈-theories L and L ′ would have to be defined so as to include as an axiom thatσ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ andσ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ respectively. We would then need to show that * σ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ, but this would follow since k 0 is the identity on ν 0 . Furthermore, it would need to be shown that σ ′ ↾ µ = σ ↾ µ, but this would follow from the requirement that σ ′ ↾ µ = σ A ↾ µ, and the fact that such ordinals are computed properly by A.
